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USE AND ABUSE OF TAX REGULATIONS
IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
By RANDOLPH E. PAULt
"Castle or no castle, let us row as if it were there."'
THE case of Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,2 decided
by the Supreme Court on January 30, 1939, bids fair to become a land-
mark in tax law; yet the great importance of the case has been widely
unrecognized. The Court decided that the Treasury's power to make
retroactive amendments changing Treasury regulations or decisions may
not be exercised where Congress has by repeated reenactment given its
sanction to the existing regulations. Startled persons in the .Treasury
immediately asked: "Will the Commissioner in the future dare to issue
regulations without a fear that his original thoughts on the subject may
prove to be a boomerang?" If Congress gave thought to the matter,
the natural question would be: "Will we dare in the future to enact a
comprehensive revenue act without a complete study of the regulations
issued by the Commissioner?" There was some talk of seeking re-
argument because of the far-reaching echoes of the decision in other
fields of law. But reargument is a desperate remedy, and both Govern-
ment and taxpayers were fortunate in that another case, Helvering v.
Wilshire Oil Company,3 furnished the Court with an opportunity to
clarify the law on this important subject. Many aspects of problems,
both old and new, as to the effect of tax regulations must be re-examined
in the light of these significant decisions.
I
Even with allowances for the complexity of tax law, the bulk of admin-
istrative regulations is surprising. Since the advent of the first World
"War and the attendant increasing intricacy of the statutes, administrative
regulations have assumed an ever-increasing importance in tax adminis-
tration. The current income tax regulations alone run to 358 pages; and
the Cumulative Bulletins, containing rulings upon all the outstanding
federal taxes, are sufficient to comprise twenty-five sizeable volumes -
a limitless source of joy for scholars and of confusion for taxpayers.
t Sterling Lecturer on Taxation, Yale Law School; Member of New York, New
Jersey and Federal Bars.
Mr. George Allan, of the New York and Illinois Bars, has rendered his usual in-
valuable assistance in connection with this Article, both by way of indefatigable research
and constructive suggestion. Mr. Oscar Sachs of the New York Bar has also made im-
portant suggestions.
1. Quoted in FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) 320.
2. 306 U. S. 110 (1939), aff'g, 97 F. (2d) 302 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), which rev'd,
35 B.T.A. 949 (1937).
3. 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (U. S. 1939), rehearing denied, Dec. 11, 1939.
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The conceptualist might argue that these outpourings of regulations
should have little, if any, influence upon the courts in exercising their
judicial function of interpreting the statute. Especially might this be
argued since the Treasury Department has the function of collecting
revenue, and it would therefore be expecting too much of human nature
that its executive constructions of the statutes should invariably maintain
a studious impartiality.4 But to accord some weight to executive con-
structions makes for greater uniformity of interpretation than would
result from leaving construction de novo to our scattered judicial tribunals.
A court cannot reason in a mental vacuum on the meaning of words, and
the guidance of "able men, and masters of the subject"' is not lightly
to be scouted. Attention is thereby drawn to the practical implications of
various possible constructions which might otherwise be overlooked by
the judges in their ivory towers. Moreover, if Congress does not interfere
with an outstanding administrative construction, it has been argued -
though with little realism-that even without a reenactment of the
statute, Congressional silence impliedly approves the construction.0 Also,
since in many cases members of the administrative branch assist in draft-
ing tax statutes, Congress may well have intended to adopt their view-
point.' Therefore it is a time-honored doctrine that in construing a
statute, "the cotemporaneous construction of those who were called upon
to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect,
is entitled to very great respect." s
The rule in favor of departmental constructions also assumes that the
interpretation is a "fair" and "reasonable" one.' The test of fairness or
reasonableness naturally defies precise definition. Apparently the courts
have meant by this very flexible requirement only that the regulation
4. See the engaging candor in IS Op. Att'y Gen'l 246 (1835); 1 PAUL AN M1.r-
TEs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAxX0-rioN (1934) § 3.18.
5. United States N% Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1877) ; cf. Williamsport Wire Rope
Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551 (1928).
6. Hahn v. United States, 107 U. S. 402 (18M2).
7. See Comment (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 469.
8. Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (U. S. 1827). This assumes, it is
repeatedly said, that the statutory provision in question is open to ambiguity. Koshland
v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936). But virtually any statutory phrase whatsoever is
open to construction; especially in complex tax statutes it is a chimerical illusion that
there ordinarily is a meaning at once apparent to the honest, untutored understanding of
the ordinary man. Compare Justice McKenna in Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U. S. 221, 224
(1918). When the courts say that a statutory provision is perfectly plain and unambigu-
ous, they mean in reality that they have already interpreted the statute, and that the
statute as so construed needs no further construction. Radin, Stautory interprotation
(1930) 43 HAv. L. Rav. 863, 869. In fact, the construction which to one court is ED
crystal-clear as to render any administrative interpretation superfluous is often the exact
opposite of the construction adopted by other tribunals. See Janney v. Comm'r, C. C. A.
3d, Dec. 26, 1939.
9. Sterling Oil & Gas Co. v. Lucas, 51 F. (2d) 413, 416 (W. D. Ky. 1931).
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must reasonably conform to the statute which it interprets: would a
reasonable man, in the position of the Commissioner, have issued a similar
ruling?' ° The regulation does not have to be the best of all possible
interpretations in the *court's opinion. For example, consider Article
23(o)-i of Regulations 101, providing that where spouses file a joint
return, the percentage limitation regarding deductions for charitable con-
tributions is based upon the separate rather than the aggregate net income;
or Article 11 of Regulations 80, providing that where the executor of
an estate exercises the option to value an estate as of a year after the
decedent's death, the income received by the estate during the year after
death should be included in the estate corpus.'" Under the language of
the statute and all available legislative material, the opposite interpretation
would in either case be equally permissible; there is no reason except the
interests of the revenue to prefer one solution over the other. The court's
conclusion in this situation comes down to the simple question whether
the particular court believes that the undoubtedly imperative need for
revenue should be followed with Draconian severity as a deliberate judi-
cial policy, or whether the construction most favorable to the taxpayer
should be adopted in case of ambiguity.'
The construction placed upon a statutory provision by the adminis-
trative officials is of course not conclusively binding. 13 Courts must ulti-
10. Patten, Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations (1926) 4 N.I.T.M. 423. See
Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459, 470 (1900) : ". . . Those who insist that such a
regulation is invalid must make its invalidity so manifest that the court has no choice
except to hold that the Secretary has exceeded his authority and employed means that are
not at all appropriate to the end specified in the act of Congress."
11. Upheld in Saks, et al., Ex'rs v. Higgins, 29 F. Supp. 996 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
12. See De Ganay v. Lederer, 239 Fed. 568, 572 (E. D. Pa. 1917), aff'd, 250 U. S.
376 (1919).
A definite and well-established administrative practice, even though not reflected in the
published rulings at all, may be of "persuasive weight" in construing a statute if the
practice is not inconsistent with outstanding court decisions. See Sanford's Estate v.
Comm'r, 60 Sup. Ct. 51, 59 (U. S. 1939), rehearing denied, Dec. 4, 1939; and cl. Union
Stock Yard & Transit Co. of Chicago v. United States, 60 Sup. Ct. 193 (U. S. 1939).
The weight given to such a practice cannot be considerable, however, since there is no
disclosure of the reasons prompting the practice, as there often is in the case of informal
published rulings. Moreover, proving such a uniform Bureau practice is naturally a very
difficult if not impossible task, especially when the argument is advanced by the taxpayer,
as was true in the Sanford case. And a stipulation as to what the administrative practice
was may be excluded from consideration by the court on the ground that it involves a
legal, rather than factual, conclusion of the stipulators. See Sanford's Estate v. Comm'r,
60 Sup. Ct. 51 (U. S. 1939). Moreover, the rule as to Congressional validation by re-
enactments could hardly add anything to the weight of such a factor, since it would be
stretching fiction to the breaking point to attribute to the legislators familiarity with
internal Bureau practices.
13. The expressions of the courts in speaking of the deference due to regulations
vary all the way from statements that a "regulation rises to no higher dignity than an
expression of opinion" [Douglas v. Edwards, 298 Fed. 229, 245 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924),
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mately rely upon their own construction of the statute, not upon the
Commissioner's regulations, since it is only by an independent canvassing
of the statute's meaning that they can determine whether or not the regu-
lations are reasonably appropriate to the Congressional intent. This is
indicated by the fact that a reference to the regulations is usually thrown
in toward the end of the opinion, revealing that the court first reached
its own conclusion and then examined the regulations to ascertain their
reasonableness in the light of that conclusion. Especially is this common
in the case of Supreme Court opinions.' 4 More useful than any empty
formulae as to the respect due regulations is the technique of consulting
such practical considerations as the length of time during which the
regulation has been outstanding and has therefore presumably been relied
upon,"a the e-xtent of the discretion with which the Commissioner was
clothed by the statute,'6 and the confusion or inconvenience which would
ensue from a reversal of the regulations.1 7
II
Among the innumerable fictions which have formed a part of the
science of law, that which holds the record for unrealism is the doctrine
that where a statute has been reenacted in the same form after an admin-
istrative construction, Congress has silently approved and incorporated the
rev'd on other grounds, 269 U. S. 204 (1925)] to statements that they are entitled to
"great weight" [Spring City Foundry Co. Y. Comm'r. 292 U. S. 182, 189 (1934), rehear-
ing denied, 292 U. S. 613, (1934)] or are not to be overruled "except for weighty rea-
sons" [Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 378 (1931)] or even that
they have almost the force and effect of law. Cf. Maryland Cas. Co. -. United States, 251
U. S. 342 (1920). But see Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936); Patten, supra
note 10. These degrees of verbal rhetoric, however, merely clutter up the interpretative
problem, and could be abolished from the judicial lexicon with little loss; it is most un-
likely that an actual judgment in many cases would have been different if the court had
started out with exactly the opposite formula. [Cole, From Treasury Decision to Judi.
cial Decision (1934) 12 TAX MAG. 531 ; Comment (1939) 52 HAnv. L. RE%. 1163, 1164].
14. Sometimes, in fact, a ruling contrary to the Court's conclusion is not even ac-
corded the honor of mention. United States v. Hudson, 299 U. S. 493 (1937). But see
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U. S. 1, 3 (1931), in which Justice Holmes
contented himself with the terse statement that there wvas no reason why the regulations
regarding cancelled bonds "should not be accepted as a correct statement of the law."
15. But see Dayton Bronze Bearing Co. v. Gilligan, 281 Fed. 709, 714 (C. C. A. 6thi,
1922) (administrative construction given "due consideration" regardless of the length of
time it has been enforced by the Department).
16. See New Creek Co. v. Lederer, 295 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924), cert. dcnicd,
265 U. S. 581 (1924) (arising under the 1916 Act, Section 12 of which allowed, in the
case of corporations, a "reasonable" depletion under rules prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury); Murphy Oil Company v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299 (1932), rehearing dcnicd,
Jan. 9, 1933. See also the inventory provision [§22(c)], and the provision in Section
45 empowering the Commissioner to reallocate the income of affiliated corporations.
17. United States v. Dickson, 15 Pet. 141 (U. S. 1841).
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existing ruling.'8 Our tax laws are reenacted so repeatedly that this rule
is invoked more often than the general statement as to the validity of
regulations standing alone. Unfortunately, the reenactment rule presumes
an attention on the part of Congress in connection with tax legislation
which is more ideal than real. The thought is that Congress, each time
it passes a revenue act, has omniscience as to all outstanding regulations
and judicial decisions and that it will be thoroughly diligent to correct
by legislation any interpretation with which it disagrees.'" There follows
the thought that inaction is action in that a failure to legislate implies
an agreement with all outstanding regulations, without any apparent dis-
tinction as to their interpretative or legislative character.
20
Anyone cognizant of the processes and exigencies of tax legislation
is perfectly familiar with the simple fact that any such presumption is
not only artificial, but in large part unfounded. This is particularly true
with respect to regulations which are relatively new, and which have been
followed by only one or two statutory reenactments. The time lag in
tax law 21 is such that frequently many years elapse before litigation brings
a regulation of doubtful validity to the battle line. Of course, the regula-
18. The unreality of the rule is emphasized in cases such as the Rcynolds case, in
which the applicable statutory provision was reenacted in identical form both subsequent
to the original regulation and again after an amendment to the regulation.
Strictly speaking, the term "reenactment" should possibly include only those blanket
passages of an entire act such as occurred in 1932, 1934, 1936, 1938 and in the enactment
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939; of lesser weight in this connection should be piece-
meal amendments (such as were enacted in 1935 and 1937) which merely fail to revise the
remaining provisions. The passage of the 1939 Code may therefore weaken the doctrine
of statutory approval, since thereafter there will generally be only detailed amendments to
specific Code sections rather than a general repassage. See Alvord, Trcasury Regulations
and the Wilshire Oil Case (Privately published manuscript, 1939) 14; but cf. Comm'r v.
Haines, 104 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Helvering v. Cronin, 106 F. (2d) 907
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
19. See McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488, 492 (1931), rehearing
denied, Oct. 12, 1931; National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 147 (1920).
20. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269, 273 (1933).
In Bryant Estate v. Comi'r, and Comm'r v. Hallock, now pending in the United States
Supreme Court, the same contention is made by the taxpayers in arguing the implied
adoption by Congress of Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935)
and the Treasury regulations following that case. In 1937, after the St. Loids case, Article
17 of Regulations 80 was amended by expressly exempting from estate tax any transfer
in which the decedent-transferor reserved a mere possibility of reverter. This amended
regulation was outstanding when the 1937 and 1938 Acts were passed and also when
Section 302(c) became Section 811(c) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. See San-
ford's Estate v. Comm'r, 60 Sup. Ct. 51 (U. S. 1939), in which the Court states at p.
60: "A change of practice to conform to judicial decision . ..will be accepted as con-
trolling when consistent with our decisions."
21. See Traynor, Administrative and ludicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate,
and Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal (1938) 38 CoL. L. Ray. 1393.
[Vol. 49 : 660
USE AND ABUSE OF TAX REGULATIONS
tions themselves are a matter of public record."- But Congress in tax
legislation usually hits only the high spots which are forced upon its
attention by conspicuous judicial decisions or which are called to its
attention by the Treasury and diligent taxpayers. 3 Even long-outstanding
regulations are hardly in fact approved by a legislative reenactment of the
statute without change. The very regulations involved in the Reynolds
case went through many editions, and there were years of litigation on
the subject before they were changed.2 4 This is true in many cases; it
is particularly true of a regulation in favor of the taxpayer. In such
cases taxpayers will not object and the Commissioner is in the position
of having to attack his own regulations or amend them by Treasury
decision.2 5 No person, therefore, could honestly claim that the doctrine
of approval by reenactment has any solid factual foundation.
It would now, of course, be a hopelessly late date to deplore this well-
settled rule of construction. On the whole there is no reason to deplore
it; though one may denounce the reasoning of the doctrine as a mockery
of the facts, one may yet applaud its results. Undoubtedly in most cases
it does produce pragmatically desirable results. -" True, the partiality,
rather than impartiality, of administrative rulings constitutes an objection
to the theory of validation even where the regulation has been long out-
standing. But despite this fact, the doctrine merits some of the respect
which the courts have extended to it. One may speak of a law of inertia
in law as well as in physics,2 and upholding the status quo has always
been a fundamental policy of the law and may, in fact, have a special
22. See Griswold, Governient in Ignorance of the La -. A Plea for Better Publica-
tlion of Executive Legislation (1934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 198.
23. Where a regulation was actually considered by Congress in connection with a re-
enactment of the statute, as where there is an unsuccessful attempt to change the law
because of its administrative construction, there is some rational basis for saying that
a regulation has become embedded in the statute. Comment (1939) 52 Hnv. L Rmr.
1163, 1170. See Pfaff v. Bender, 38 F. (2d) 642 (E. D. La. 1929), aff'd, 38 F. (2d) 649
(C. C. A. 5th, 1930), aff'd, 282 U. S. 127 (1930). And see Watts v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d)
981, 983 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), aff', 296 U. S. 387 (1935), involving a change by Con-
gress of a related part of the statute.
24. See cases cited in Note (1939) 39 Cox. L. REv. 716, 718, n. 8.
Matters might be different if revenue acts were few and if reenactment were a matter
involving meticulous study of every phase of the statute and regulations. But this is not
true. We have the disease of almost annual revenue acts; and the revenue acts we dr
have are laden with detail. There is great fecundity even if the quality of the progeny is
debatable. Even the members of the Congressional committees having charge of drafting
amendments rarely make any meticulous emamination into the endless ramifications of
the regulations. Indeed, the very provision in the statute delegating to the Treasury the
power to make all necessary regulations shows an intention on the part of Congress to
wash its hands of all attention to such technical details.
25. See Sanford's Estate v. Comm'r, 60 Sup. Ct. 51 (LT. S. 1939).
26. See GaxY, NATURE AND SouRcEs OF L.W (1st ed. 1909) §§ 74-S9.
27. Cole, From Treasury Decision to J.tdicial Decision (1934) 12 TAx V.Ac. 531.
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relevance in tax law. Applied as a persuasive but not a conclusive factor,
the principle affords an increased degree of predictability without causing
any inordinate hardship to taxpayers. 8 In other words, the same reluc-
tance properly shown by the courts in declaring an act of Congress not
to be within the powers granted by the Constitution is relevant when the
issue is the validity of a well-established administrative construction. 29
The rule as to reenactment, therefore, accomplishes a desirable result
in adding stability to regulations upon which taxpayers are forced to
rely. In view, however, of the fictional quality of the premise underlying
the reenactment rule, there is special need for a scrutiny of the conse-
quences of the rule and the limits of its application. We are deliberately
substituting "a fraction of reality for the complete range of causes and
effects."" And we need to be careful that the rule does not do more
harm than good - that a fiction intended for the sake of justice should
not work "contrary to real truth or substance of the theory."' 31 The net
result of the rule should be analyzed.32
As with respect to regulations standing alone, analysis may first be
made from the approach of the weight actually attributed by the courts
to the reenactment doctrine in arriving at a construction. Is the court
putting dress clothes upon the expression of its own opinion, or is it
refraining from an opinion because it feels itself bound, or is it bowing
to administrative pressure though it disagrees ? 3 The reenactment rule
28. Ibid.
29. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U. S. 459 (1900).
30. VAIHINGER, The Philosophy of As If, quoted in FRANK, LAW AND TIIR MODERN
MIND (1930) 327.
31. Quoted by FaANK, op. cit. supra note 30, at 167.
32. The doctrine does not apply to informal rulings which do not rise to the dignity
of regulations. See Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 (1934). A merely
nominal effect is given by most decisions to such informal rulings. But note the reliance
placed on a Gen'l Counsel Memo. in Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18, 23
(U. S. 1939), rehearing denied, Dec. 11, 1939.
Nor will the rule be applicable where the Treasury practice has not been consistent
[Central Real Estate Co., 17 B.T.A. 776 (1929), petition for review disnissed, 47 F.
(2d) 1036 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931)], or where the regulation is itself ambiguous. See Burnet
v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U. S. 1, 16 (1932) (". . . . ambiguous regulations are of
little value in resolving statutory ambiguities."). The fact that the administrative inter-
pretation had only a brief career before the reenactment may also preclude any argument
of legislative approval. Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245 (1926).
The legislative materials on a given section might-in fact usually would-show a
complete lack of any reference to departmental rulings, and it might be argued that such
a circumstance would disprove the supposed intent to effect an implied incorporation of
the regulation. But such negative evidence would undoubtedly not avail to defeat the re-
enactment rule, which is based not so much upon active acquiescence as upon the assump-
tion that the ruling would have come to the affirmative attention of Congress if it had
involved any violent departure from the spirit of the act.
33. See Securities Allied Corp. v. Comm'r, 95 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert.
denied, 305 U. S. 617 (1938); Comment (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rav. 1163, 1167.
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has suffered the fate of many convenient rules of statutory construction
and has been stated so frequently that various statements of it differ
materially. 4
Consequently the degree of compulsion in the reenactment rule is a
matter of doubt. It is infrequent that the courts are willing to rest their
conclusion wholly upon the regulations even when they are buttressed
with the implied sanction of reenactment.3" Even with legislative reenact-
ment, the regulation in order to be applied must be reasonable and is
usually referred to only as strong evidence, rather than the sole support
of the construction laid down by the courts. The opinion in the recent
Wilshire case makes it clear that the reenactment doctrine is not an abso-
lute, ironclad rule, and if anything might be suggested as a measure of
the degree of compulsion in the rule, the length of the period during
which a regulation has been outstanding is a sensible test. Where a regu-
lation has been outstanding for a long time, as was the regulation involved
in the Reynolds case, and where it has been followed by several reenact-
ments of the statute, its past may become practically impregnable." But
where a regulation has been in effect but a short time and has been ratified
by only one statutory reenactment, little weight need be given to the
negative sanction involved in the reenactment. Any other rule would fly
in the face of the realities of the legislative process, since it takes time
to develop the implications of any regulation on a controversial subject.
There must be a conflict of ideas, and cases must be brought to the courts
before it can reasonably be assumed that the subject of the regulation
34. Judge Stone pointed out in Walker v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 103, 106-7
(C. C. A. 8th, 1936) a number of variations in the statement of the rule-such as that
the executive construction after repeated reenactment has the "'force of law"'; that it
"'must be accepted"'; that it "'will not be overturned except for very cogent reasons";
that it should be given "'great weight, even if we doubted the correctness of the rul-
ing'"; that it will not be "'disturbed except for reasons of weight'"; that "'were the
matter less clear"' the court "'should be constrained' to follow it"; and that it should
be followed "'when not plainly erroneous' ". judge Stone concludes that a "'afe state-
ment" of the rule is that "where a statutory provision is ambiguous, and the executive
department which must apply and enforce it declares a construction (not in itself am-
biguous . . . . ) for administrative purposes, and thereafter Congress re-enacts the pro-
vision without substantial change, the courts will accept that construction unless it be
'plainly erroneous.!"
35. See Taft v. Comm'r, 304 U. S. 351 (1938). It is true that in Helvering u. Win-
mill, 305 U. S. 79 (1938), upholding a regulation that brokers' commissions on the pur-
chase of stock should be added to the stock's cost basis rather than deducted as an ex-
pense, Justice Black confined his discussion almost completely to the Treasury regula-
tions. See Note (1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 468. But even here the Court unquestionably
assumed the independent reasonableness of the construction set forth in the regulations,
which were plainly an admissible interpretation of the statute and which neither the
Treasury nor Congress had evinced any desire to alter. Compare the Rcynolds case, p.
670 et seq. infra.
36. See Oil Shares, Inc., 29 B.T.A. 664, 669 (1934).
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has come to the attention of Congress. Moreover, any other rule would
be a perilous one. It would have the twin effects of compelling timidity
in a rule-making Commissioner and requiring Congress to examine into
every phase of the revenue regulations before it dared pass a compre-
hensive revenue act.
And the weight to be given to the rule under discussion should also
depend upon whether there are outstanding Board and court decisions
in conflict with the rule stated in the regulations. Here we have a con-
flict of statutory rules of construction, for a judicial, as well as an
administrative, construction of a prior act may be sanctioned by Con-
gressional reenactment. In other words, where Congress uses language
which has been construed by the courts it must be assumed to have em-
ployed that language in the sense in which the courts had previously
construed it." This presumption, in fact, is more defensible than the
related presumption as to administrative constructions, since Congressional
familiarity with a judicial construction is equally possible and since a
judicial holding is a more impartial ruling, rendered in a litigated pro-
ceeding rather than in an ex parte regulation."
The most familiar limitation upon the doctrine as to reenactment is
the qualification that if the regulation definitely goes beyond the limits
of the statute, no amount of legislative reenactment will validate the
ruling."0 To hold otherwise would mean that taxpayers could never rely
even upon the clearest terminology of the statute. A regulation which
does not carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed in the statute,
and which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is
"a mere nullity."'4 0 Thus in Blatt Company v. United States,4' the con-
37. Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 283 U. S. 301 (1931) ; McCaughn v. Her-
shey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488 (1931), rehearing denied, Oct. 12, 1931; Hecht v.
Malley, 265 U. S. 144 (1924) ; Latimer v. United States, 223 U. S. 501 (1912).
38. The Government itself may in particular litigated cases be taking a position in-
consistent with that announced in the outstanding regulations. Cf. Hadley Falls Trust
Co. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 346 (D. Mass. 1938). This fact could hardly of itself
preclude the doctrine of legislative adoption from applying, since the fact that formal
regulations are still outstanding and unamended is more significant than the fact that in
an isolated case the government may be attacking the same regulations. Nevertheless,
the fact that the Government itself does not regard the administrative interpretation as uni-
versally controlling does reveal that administrative needs and interests are not always
best served by the rule announced in the regulations, which somewhat weakens the premise
for implied legislative acceptance. Cf. Sanford's Estate v. Comm'r, 60 Sup. Ct. 51
(U. S. 1939).
39. United States v. Maryland Casualty Co., 49 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 645 (1931) ; Titsworth v. Comm'r, 73 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 3d,
1934). See also First Nat. Bank of Greeley v. United States, 86 F. (2d) 938, 939 (C. C.
A. 10th, 1936), qualifying the rule as to legislative adoption of an executive construction
by the phrase "unless it is clearly inconsistent with a statute." See Note (1939) 39 COL.
L. REv. 716, 720.
40. Manhattan Gen'l Equipment Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U. S. 129, 134 (1936), rehear-
ing denied, 297 U. S. 728 (1936).
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troversy centered about the now twenty-year-old counterpart of Article
48 of Regulations 45, promulgated in 1920 and providing that a lessor
might be taxed annually for a proportionate share of the value of lessee's
improvements. The lower court in ruling against the taxpayer expressed
the view that Congress had, by reenactments over a period of many years,
put its seal of approval upon the administrative interpretation. This
theory, however, was rejected by the Supreme Court without the dignity
of any answer beyond the brief statement that "Treasury Regulations
can add nothing to income as defined by Congress." The regulation was
therefore rejected as invalid despite its numerous repetitions.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recently had occasion
to point out that "A plainly erroneous departmental construction does not
become correct by any subsequent reenactment of the provision of the
statute to which it pertains."42 In this case the taxpayer had established
a term trust, administered by himself as trustee, and the Government
was attempting to tax the income to him under Article 166-1 of the
income tax regulations. Even though this article had appeared in suc-
cessive regulations, the court held the interpretation void as being "in
direct conflict with the plain language and the meaning of the statute."
The court's position was bolstered by the fact that a year before the
regulations in question had been promulgated, the Commissioner had
failed in an attempt to have the statute itself amended to conform with
his views. In the eyes of the court, this fact clearly demonstrated the
Commissioner's lack of faith in his own contention under the existing
phraseology of the statute.
Also, where the law is so plain as to render the particular regulation
superfluous, the subsequent reenactment of the statute does not consti-
tute an adoption of the administrative construction."' In other words,
even if the regulation is not palpably erroneous, legislative reenactment
may not operate to make it part of the law if the statute itself is suffi-
ciently clear even without the aid of any regulation. If there was no need
for the regulation originally, the reenactment of the statute will not supply
that need.
41. 305 U. S. 267 (1938). See also United States v. Missouri Pacific R. RL, 278 U. S.
269 (1929) ; Boca Ratone Co. v. Comm'r, 86 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936).
42. Clifford, Jr. v. United States, 105 F. (2d) 51z6 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939). See also
F. NV. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert denied,
302 U. S. 768 (1938), overturning the method for computing the foreign income tax pro-
vided in Article 131-8 of the regulations; Comm'r v. Shattuck, 97 F. (2d) 790 (C. C. A.
7th, 1938), permitting the use of "blockmge" in v'aluing stock, despite continued regula-
tions to the contrary; Herman A. Holsten, Ex'r, 35 B. T. A. 56S (1937), aff'd per
curtianz, 93 F. (2d) 1002 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) (voiding a portion of Art. S0, Reg. 19);
Hughes Tool Co., 40 B.T.A. No. 147 (1939) (regarding the provisions of Reg. 75, Art.
41 (d) as to consolidated returns).
43. Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U. S. 573, 582 (1933) ; Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S.
441 (1936) ; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. United States, 2,2 U. S. 740 (1931).
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The reenactment rule must of course also be qualified by the thought
that the Commissioner cannot, even by a regulation which conforms to
the statute, undertake to subject to tax what is not income. Thus in
two recent cases 44 an administrative interpretation which had survived
the passage of four revenue acts was declared invalid despite this history
of apparent Congressional approval. By Article 58 of income tax Regu-
lations 74, the taxpayer had been given the option of reporting the entire
proceeds from a sale of stock rights in gross income or apportioning
part of the cost of the original stock to the rights. The first alternative,
however, had already been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court. 5 Even though the regulations offered a second, and constitutional,
method of reporting the gain upon a sale of rights, it was held that no
amount of legislative reenactment could give validity to regulations which
were beyond the legislative power of Congress itself."
III
The Reynolds case involved the question of gain to a corporation on
the resale of treasury stock. The Reynolds Company on various occasions
between 1921 and 1929 purchased its own Class B common stock. The
stock so purchased was treated as treasury stock; its cost was entered in
the company's accounts as "Investments in Non-competitive Companies."
No increase or reduction of capital stock was made on account of the
stock so purchased and its resale from time to time. In 1929 the company
sold some shares at a profit over cost of approximately $285,000. This
profit went through the company's books as cash and was added to its
surplus. In the company's return it was treated as non-taxable income.
In 1936 the Commissioner asserted a deficiency for 1929 on the basis
of this profit, basing his claim upon Regulations 74, Article 66, as amended
by T. D. 4430,47 promulgated May 2, 1934.4' The Board sustained the
44. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 19 F. Supp, 15 (1937) ; Walter
E. Buck, 40 B.T.A. 536 (1939). Cf. Hewitt Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 76 F. (2d) 880 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1935).
45. Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U. S. 247 (1922), applying the theory of
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
46. Where the administrative interpretation raises issues of constitutional power, the
doctrine of approval by reenactment would involve the unwarranted assumption that Con-
gress intended to exceed its legislative powers; therefore, in such a case the reenactment
doctrine must yield to the even stronger constructional canon that Congress intended a
meaning which would clearly preserve the constitutionality of the statute.
47. XIII-1 Cum. BULL. 36 (1934).
48. This new Treasury decision was largely prompted by the decision of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals in Comm'r v. S. A. Woods Machine Co., 57 F. (2d) 635 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 613 (1932), although another inducement leading
to the promulgation of the ruling may have been the possibility under the 1934 Act of
taxing corporations upon gains from such transactions without a full deduction for losses
on similar sales. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, p. 19, E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Comm'r,
98 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), modified, 102 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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Commissioner. The circuit court of appeals reversed the Board and held
with the taxpayer.
The rule of the regulations before amendment was that if a corpora-
tion purchased any of its stock, and held it as treasury stock, the sale
thereof constituted a capital transaction so that the proceeds should be
treated as capital and not as income. The supplanted regulations contained
the following categorical general statement: "A corporation realizes no
gain or loss from the purchase or sale of its own stock." T. D. 4430,
on the other hand, qualified this broad rule by a statement that where a
corporation dealt in its own shares "as it might in the shares of another
corporation, the resulting gain or loss is to be computed in the same
manner as though the corporation were dealing in the shares of another." 9
This provision of the regulations was meant to change the rule in effect
under Regulations 74 before amendment by T. D. 4430 and also the
rule of previous regulations. The unqualified administrative construction
in previous regulations had been uniform with respect to each of the
revenue acts beginning with the 1913 Act and extending to the 1932
Act, 0 and this uniform construction had been approved by the enactment
of a number of successive revenue acts. Of course, a number of revenue
acts were also adopted after May 2, 1934, when T. D. 4430 was pro-
mulgated. 1
49. The new Treasury decision added the language: ".... So also if the corpora-
tion receives its own stock as consideration upon the sale of property by it, or in satis-
faction of indebtedness to it, the gain or loss resulting is to be computed in the -came
manner as though the payment had been made in any other property. Any gain derived
from such transactions is subject to tax, and any loss sustained is allowable as a deduc-
tion where permitted by the provisions of applicable statutes."
50. For authorities sustaining this statement, see Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., 306 U. S. 110, 114, n. 9 (1939). It is noteworthy, however, that a number of
decisions prior to the Reyiolds case had refused to follow the original regulations where
a company actually had dealt in its own stock as it might in the stock of a separate cor-
poration. Note (1939) 39 CoL. L. REv. 716, 718.
51. Thus raising a conflict between presumptions. Note (1939) 39 Co. L Rxv. 716,
718; Comment (1939) 52 HARv. L. Rsv. 1163, 1169. Commenting on this aspect of the
decision in the Reynolds case, Professor Traynor has said: "It is a parado-ical situa-
tion that the later interpretation should yield to the earlier one when Congress by con-
tinning to reenact the statutory provisions impliedly gives its blessing to both of the
Treasury's conflicting regulations!' Traynor, Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States, z938 Term (Paper read at Nat. Tax Conference, 1939) 73. However,
Congress by its repeated reenactments of the statute had already declared that for the
year 1929 the sale of treasury stock by a corporation should not give rise to taxable in-
come. Under such circumstances it is likely that Congress itself could not in 1934 have
validly amended Section 22(a) with respect to such transactions consummated in 1929.
Cf. People ex rel. Beck v. Graves, 9 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 217 (1939); therefore it was even
more clear that the same result could not be reached by the Commissioner's regulations
or by any implied Congressional adoption through reenactment of the statute after the
change in the regulations.
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These facts raised the question whether the amendment effected by
T. D. 4430, and impliedly sanctioned at least as to the future by subse-
quent reenactments of the statute, could be applied retroactively in the
face of an administrative construction to the contrary which had also
been sanctioned by subsequent reenactments of the statute. In its brief
in the Reynolds case, the Government cited what it called an "impressive"
number of cases supporting the reenactment rule. 2 The Government
also pointed to two cases in which the Supreme Court in fact gave effect
to amended regulations despite reenactment of the statutory provisions
while former regulations were in force. In one of these cases, Murphy
Oil Company v. Burnet,53 the regulations, as amended in 1926, were held
to govern the allowance for depletion in respect of royalties received in
1919 and 1920, when the 1918 Act was in force. The other of the
two cases, Morrissey v. Commissioner," involved the meaning of the
term "association." In determining that meaning for purposes of the
1918 and 1921 Acts, the Commissioner promulgated a regulation to the
effect that if the beneficiaries of a business trust had a voice in the busi-
ness, the trust was an association." Then the Supreme Court decided
Hecht v. Malley,56 and the Treasury issued new regulations to the effect
that even in the absence of control by the beneficiaries a trust constituted
an association if the trustees of an operating trust were associated like
corporate directors for the purpose of a business enterprise. 7 The Court
held that the subsequent regulations should be applied despite legislative
reenactment while the earlier regulations were in force, and stressed the
range of administrative power to re-examine and reformulate its con-
struction of the statute in the following language:
52. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 337 (1930) ; Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101,
118 (1930) ; Burnet v. Thompson Oil & Gas Co., 283 U. S. 301, 307 (1931); McCaughn
v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U. S. 488, 492 (1931); United States v. Kirby L. Co.,
284 U. S. 1, 3 (1931) ; Old C. R. R. v. Comm'r, 284 U. S. 552, 557 (1932) ; Murphy Oil
Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299, 302, 307 (1932), rehearing denied, Jan. 9, 1933; Mass. Mut.
L. Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269, 273 (1933) ; United States v. Dakota-Montana
Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459, 466 (1933) ; Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172, 175 (1933) ; Helver-
ing v. Bliss, 293 U. S. 144, 151 (1934) ; Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 172,
178, 180 (1934); Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 289, 293
(1934) ; Hartley v. Comm'r, 295 U. S. 216, 220 (1935) ; McFeely v. Comm'r, 296 U. S.
102, 108 (1935); Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U. S. 344, 355 (1935) ; United States v.
Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U. S. 88, 95 (1936) ; Lang v. Comm'r, 304 U.
S. 264, 270 (1938); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79, 83 (1938). See also, -einer
v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 U. S. 232 (1927) ; Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 393 (1933).
53. 287 U. S. 299 (1932), rehearing denied, Jan. 9, 1933.
54. 296 U. S. 344 (1935).
55. U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 1504; U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 1504, following the
Supreme Court decision in Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S. 223 (1919).
56. 265 U. S. 144 (1924).
57. T. D. 3748, IV-2 Cu.r. BULL. 7 (1925), amending U. S. Treas. Reg. 65, Art.
1504.
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"As the statute merely provided that the term 'corporation' should
include 'associations,' without further definition, the Treasury De-
partment was authorized to supply rules for the enforcement of the
Act within the permissible bounds of administrative construction.
Nor canithis authority be deened to be so restricted that the regula-
tions, once issued, could not later be clarified or enlarged so as to
meet administrative exigencies or conform to judicial decision.
. . .We find no ground for the contention that by the enactment
of the Revenue Act of 1924 the Department was limited to its pre-
vious regulations as to associations. . . .,,s
These two cases did not dissuade the Supreme Court from the view
that the Commissioner had no power retroactively to change the earlier
regulations. The Supreme Court, affirming the court below, decided
that no retroactive effect was permissible." Section 605 of the 1928 Act
gave the Treasury power to correct misinterpretations, inaccuracies, or
omissions under regulations, and thereby to affect cases in which tax-
payers' liability had not been finally determined, unless in the judgment
of the Treasury some good reason required that such alterations operate
only prospectively.60 The clear implication of this provision is that an
amended regulation is ordinarily applied with retroactive effect.6 But
58. Morrissey v. Comm'r, 296 U. S. 344, 354 (1935). (Italics supplied).
59. Cf. 'Murphy Oil Co. v. Bumet, 287 U. S. 299 (1932), rehearing denied, Jan. 9,
1933, in which an original construction wN-as cast aside in favor of a new retroactive ver-
sion promulgated five years later. Both the first and second rulings had survived two
reenactments of the statute. The Supreme Court mentioned the factor of reenactment
as sustaining the second regulation, but ignored the same factor in connection with the
first ruling, apparently on the ground that the earlier ruling went beyond the pale of the
statute. In Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 811 (NV. D. Pa. 1938),
the court held that the regulations as to inventories promulgated under the 1932 Act,
even if prospectively valid, could not be applied to tax liability for the year 1920.
60. For a detailed consideration of Section 605, see PAuL, SELEL-m" STrvim I%
FEDERAL TAXATION (SECOND SERIFS 1938) 79.
61. The mere use of the word "retroactive" is frequently sufficient to make even the
hardiest of taxpayers turn pale. Nevertheless, the retroactivity of interpretative regula-
tions is not per se any basis for objection, even though the regulations are made retro-
active for a greater period than the permissible period of retroactivity for net% statutory
amendments. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134 (1938), rchcaring denied, 305 U. S.
675 (1938). A practical differentiation must, of course, be drawn between regulations
supplanting or amending prior interpretations and those which represent the Commis-
sioner's first construction of the statute. In the first situation, taxpayers will have relied
upon the first construction, and there is an obvious inequity in a retrospective applica-
tion of amendments changing that construction. Even the current possibility of closing
agreements for future as well as completed transactions is too narrow a device to afford
adequate protection against such inequities.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that regulations are generally interprelative, rather
than legislative, they must ordinarily be granted retrospective application. Their opara-
tion in this respect has been compared to that of a judicial construction: both types of
rulings theoretically construe the law as it edsted continuously since the date of its
19401
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this statutory authority, the Court held, did not extend to the length of
authorizing the Treasury to repeal a rule of law established by its own
administrative construction reinforced by a number of statutory reenact-
ments. •
It does not require a vivid imagination to visualize the sweeping im-
plications of this decision. Though the Reynolds opinion was carefully
limited to an executive interpretation of a "general" provision such as
Section 22(a) which had been "uniform" for many years, vague impli-
cations of the opinion promised trouble for both taxpayers and Govern-
ment. 2 Although the result was a victory for the taxpayer upon its
particular facts, it is frequently true in tax law as well as elsewhere that
"Nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won." 00
The grim fact is that the application of the reenactment rule can more
often be urged with profit by the Government than by taxpayers. Further-
more, if there is a danger that every executive construction may become
unalterably frozen into the statute by reenactment, the inevitable tendency
will be for the Treasury to rule every doubtful issue increasingly in its
own favor and force taxpayers into increased litigation.
Also, the Reynolds case could hardly have meant to establish a rule
that a plainly erroneous regulation may be validated by subsequent statu-
tory reenactment; the Supreme Court must have meant to limit the effect
of the decision to regulations interpreting broad provisions of the statute
in respect to debatable questions. The opinion of the Supreme Court
refers to the opinion of the court below, which was affirmed, as having
found it unnecessary to decide the question whether a gain on the sale
of treasury stock is capital gain and not income,6 4 because this was "at
least a debatable question and the regulation was, therefore, proper as
an interpretation of the meaning of the section."0" Mr. Justice Roberts
enactment. See the last sentence of Justice Sutherland's opinion in the Manhattan Gen-
eral Equipment Co. case, 297 U. S. 129 (1936), rehearing denied, 297 U. S. 728 (1936), in
which this similarity was noted. Taxpayers have been notably unsuccessful in resisting
retroactive treatment on the ground of equitable estoppel, either as to reliance upon gen-
eral regulations or specific agreements with the Government. 5 PAUL AND MERTENS, LAW
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (Supp. 1938) § 53.07. Any serious inequity from retro-
active application may, of course, be corrected by the legislature, as the inequity of the
judicial interpretation in Hendler v. United States, 303 U. S. 564 (1938), rehearing denied,
304 U. S. 588 (1938) was removed by Section 213 of the 1939 Act. Cf. Field, The Legal
Force and Effect of Treasury Interpretation in THE FEDERAL INco.JE TAX (1921) 90,
109-111.
62. With respect to the Government, this was particularly true as to the virtual
emasculation of Section 605.
63. Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, in a despatch of 1815.
64. This is a curious way in which to state this issue since capital gains are, of
course, taxable income. Mr. Justice Roberts undoubtedly meant to contrast income trans-
actions and capital increment.
65. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110, 114 (1939).
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then went on to add: "We agree that § 22 (a) is so general in its terms
as to render an interpretative regulation appropriate.""c  This language
must be regarded as a premise of the Reynolds case, and as an indication
that the Supreme Court did not regard the original ruling as palpably
erroneous. As has been pointed out, 7 where the law is plain, the sub-
sequent reenactment of the statute does not constitute the adoption of
an administrative construction which is in plain contravention of the
statute.' Thus in the Manlhattan General Equipnment case, co it was stated
that, to be valid, a regulation must be consistent with the statute and must
be reasonable. The original rule, to be validated by reenactment, must
be correct, or if it does not reflect the only correct rule, it must reflect
a rule that is not plainly erroneous. If these conditions are not fulfilled,
the regulation never acquires any original life, and an amended regula-
tion becomes the primary and controlling rule in respect to the situation
presented because it first points the way for correctly applying the ante-
cedent statute. Thus, amended regulations have often been applied to
transactions wholly completed before the change, where the old regula-
tion was in conflict with the statute but the new regulation was in
harmony with it."0 Those who depend blindly upon the reenactment rule
without examination into the character and reasonableness of an original
regulation which has been followed by statutory reenactment may be
rudely awakened when the court's attention is called in their cases to
this necessary qualification of the Reynolds doctrine.
Other questions rushed to the foreground as a result of the Reynolds
case. To what extent was the rule there established founded upon the
specific facts of that case, particularly the fact that the regulation there
attempted to be changed had been in effect and relied upon for so many
66. Compare the language of the same Justice in Koshland v. Helvering. 293 U. S.
441, 446 (1936).
67. See p. 668 supra.
68. Where the line should be drawn between this situation and the Reynolds case is
a question of degree which will give trouble until "a mathematical line is arrived at by
the contact of contrary decisions" in relation to each particular tax problem; even then
the line will be arbitrary in the sense that "it might equally well have been drawn a
little farther to the one side or to the other . . . " HoLMss, TJME Co Jrox Lwv (1831)
127; cf. CAGDozo, THE: NATURE OF THE JUDIcIAL ProCSs (1921) 46.
69. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U. S. 129, 134 (1936), re-
hearing denied, 297 U. S. 728 (1936).
70. Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U. S. 129 (1936), rehearing
denied, 297 U. S. 728 (1936); Murphy Oil Co. v. Burnet, 287 U. S. 299 (1932), rehear-
hiW denied, Jan. 9, 1933; cf. Burnet v. S. & L. Building Corp., 28 U. S. 406 (1933).
Even where the original regulation was a permissible construction under the letter of
the statute, it is possible that an amended regulation might be allowed to operate retro-
spectively despite the Reynolds case if the earlier regulation had not received the added
weight of Congressional approval through reenactment.
1940]
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years and had been fortified by so many reenactments ?71 Would the same
decision have been made with respect to a regulation which had been
followed by a single legislative reenactment; or must there be more than
one reenactment, and if so, how many ?72 To what extent was the decision
in the Reynolds case dictated by the consideration that the regulation in
question dealt with an ambiguous statutory provision of doubtful mean-
ing ? 7 Would the same rule be applied where the statute merely expressed
a general rule investing the Treasury with authority to promulgate regu-
lations appropriate to its enforcement,74 showing clearly that Congress
intended to rely upon the practical experience of the Treasury for its
administration?
The most pressing question was explicitly reserved7 in the Reynolds
opinion: does the rule established by a long-outstanding regulation sanc-
tioned by reenactment become imbedded in the statute 70 to such an extent
that even its prospective alteration requires a legislative declaration, or
may the Commissioner amend regulations for the future even though
the original ruling has received legislative approval by reenactment? If
he may not do so, then the added stability produced by the reenactment
doctrine may be accomplished at too great a cost - in terms of a shackled
Commissioner, who may not change regulations when the development
of a law has shown him the way, and also in terms of a requirement
upon Congress that it particularly correct each mistaken executive con-
struction under penalty of incorporating it into the fabric of the statute."1
Can this delicate balance between stability and flexibility be achieved by
the adoption of a rule that is not too inexorable? These questions are as
important as any in the tax field today.
IV
It was not long before the question was raised of the power of the
Commissioner, in the face of a previous regulation fortified by statutory
reenactments, to amend for the future by means of a new regulation
contradicting the previous rule. In the famous Ambassador Petroleum
71. In Securities Allied Corp. v. Comm'r, 95 F. (2d) 384, 385 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
cert. denied, 305 U. S. 617 (1938), Judge Swan refers to "four subsequent re-enactments."
See also National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 146 (1920).
72. A refinement of this question arises as to whether, in seeking an implied Congres-
sional adoption, the courts may consider the number of reenactments up to the date of
litigation or (as would appear more proper) only those which antedated the taxable
transaction in question.
73. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441, 446 (1936).
74. Id. at 447.
75. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110, 116 (1939).
76. See E. R. Squibb & Sons v. Helvering, 98 F. (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), vlodi-
fled, 102 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
77. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. United States, 91 F. (2d) 973 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 768 (1938) ; Note (1939) 39 COL. L. Rav. 716, 723.
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case," the question involved was whether development expenses which the
taxpayer had elected to deduct for computing taxable net income in the
case of oil wells should also be deducted in computing the net income
from the property for purposes of Section 204(c) (2) of the 1926 Act;
50% of this net income was a limitation upon percentage depletion. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that such expenses should not be
deducted, and supported its conclusion by referring to the reenactment
of the statute without change after an administrative construction sup-
posedly to the effect that "development" expenses should not be deducted.
This case did not go to the Supreme Court,h but the question involved
ultimately had to be authoritatively answered and finally came before
that Court in the IYilshire case.80 In this case the same circuit court of
appeals, affirming the Board,"' held that in determining the net income
of the taxpayer from the property under Section 114(b) (3) of the 1928
Act, there should not be deducted development expenses which the tax-
payer, in accordance with an election given him by the regulations,82 had
deducted for purposes of computing net income upon which the tax was
laid.
8 3
In concluding that the phrase "net income . . . from the property"
referred to operating profit, the court relied almost entirely upon the
reasoning that the Treasury had so construed previous statutes, and that
this construction had been ratified by subsequent reenactment of the
statute. Certainly the Treasury had so construed and applied the 1921
and 1924 Acts.84 When the 1928 Act was passed, the same construction
was outstanding as to discovcry depletion in the case of mines, but not
as to percentage depletion in the case of oil and gas wellsY8 By regula-
78. Ambassador Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r, 81 F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
79. The Government did not ask for further review of the Ambassador case but
"rather waited for" the WVilshire case "where the question of the validity of the new regu-
lations could squarely be presented to this Court." Government Brief, p. 23, n. 10, in
Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (U. S. 1939), rehearing dcnied, Dec. 11,
1939.
80. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (U. S. 1939), rcharing denicd,
Dec. 11, 1939, rez'g, 95 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 9th, 193S).
81. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Comm'r, 35 B. T. A. 450 (1937).
82. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 223; Reg. 62, Art. 223; Reg. 65, Art. 225; Reg.
69, Art. 223; Reg. 74, Art. 243; Reg. 77, Art. 236; Reg. 86, Art. 23(m)-16; Reg. 94,
Art. 23 (m)-16; Reg. 101, Art. 23 (m)-16.
These regulations have been held valid. Ramsey v. Comm'r, 66 F. (2d) 316 (C. C. A.
10th, 1933), cert. denied. 290 T. S. 673 (1933); Grison Oil Corp. v. Comm'r, 96 F. (2d)
125 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 613 (1938) ; ef. United States v. Da-
kota-'Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 (1933).
83. In its brief in the Wilshire case, p. 9, the Government admitted that intangible
drilling or development expenses were "on the borderline between deductible business
expenses and nondeductible capital outlays."
84. U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, 65, Art. 201 (h).
85. The 1926 Act eliminated discovery depletion (as of 1925) for oil and gas wells
and substituted percentage depletion; U. S. Treas. Reg. 69, Art. 201 (h). ". . . it is
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tions issued under the 1928 Act86 on February 15, 1929, and foreshadowed
in a General Counsel's Memorandum, 87 issued in September, 1927, the
Treasury undertook to follow the practice, disapproved of in the Am-
bassador case, of compelling the deduction for purposes of the net income
limitation upon .percentage depletion of development expense which the
taxpayer elected to deduct for purposes of computing the net income upon
which he was taxed.
88
It was argued in the Ambassador case, and again in the Wilshire case,
that the failure to deduct development expense in computing net income
from the property for depletion purposes, when the same expense had
been deducted in computing the taxable net income, amounted to a double
deduction89 and there were many who felt that this .argument had con-
siderable force. Judge Garrecht in the Ambassador case replied to this
argument by stating that it did not sufficiently consider the administrative
and legislative history, and Judge Denman in the Wilshire case replied
by saying that the argument had weight only when excluding those
"future effects of the regulation on which it is based."
This and further 90 reasoning did not satisfy a persistent Treasury,
which finally contrived to secure a conflicting decision in the F. H. E. Oil
Company case." Judge Foster's opinion in this case adverted to the
radical change made from discovery to percentage depletion by the 1926
Act as of January 1, 1925, and stated that definitions of net income tinder
the 1924 and previous acts were therefore immaterial.92 The opinion
apparent that the delimitation implied in the permission to deduct 'operating expenses'
present under the earlier regulations disappeared from the 1926 regulations in case of oil
and gas wells." Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18, 24, n. 10 (U. S. 1939),
rehearing denied, Dec. 11, 1939.
86. U. S. Treas. Reg. 74, Art. 221 (i).
87. Gen'l Counsel Memo. 2315, VI-2 Cu-m. BULL. 21, issued September, 1927.
88. According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Commissioner attempted to
say that the 1928 Act "no longer means what it meant when the Congress passed it," but
what it was made to mean in 1932 when Congress reenacted the depletion clause without
change. The circuit court of appeals held that the taxpayers were not required to have
the "prescience to discern a difference in Congressional viewpoint two years in the fu-
ture." Comm'r v. Wilshire Oil Co., 95 F. (2d) 971, 973 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), rced, 60
Sup. Ct. 18 (U. S. 1939), rehearing denied, Dec. 11, 1939.
89. This argument is made by the Government in the Wilshire case in its brief, pp.
7, 16, 27, 28.
90. No attempt is made in this discussion to cover other phases of the court's reason-
ing. The emphasis here is on the development of the principle established by the Reynolds
case.
91. Comm'r v. F. H. E. Oil Co., 102 F. (2d) 596 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939), rev'g Board
Memo. Op., C. C. H. B.T.A. Serv. Memo. Dec. No. 9751-B, aff'd, 60 Sup. Ct. 26 (U. S.
1939).
92. This argument will be found at pp. 17 to 19 of the Government brief in the Wil-
shire case. The argument is that the depletion allowable previous to the 1926 Act for
years previous to 1925 was discovery depletion which was changed in the 1926 Act to
percentage depletion.
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admitted, probably erroneously, 3 that while the old construction was
continued under the 1926 Act for a time, it was changed in 1927."'
Thereafter, beginning with Article 221(i) of Regulations 74, promul-
gated in February, 1929 under the 1928 Act, the administrative con-
struction was formally changed so that it became substantially the same
as the construction later adopted under the 1932 Act." The court was
therefore able to reason that the rule of legislative approval gained nothing
from the enactment of the 1926 Act, since it was not applied under that
act for a sufficiently long period"0 to estop the Commissioner from
changing it if he should be convinced that it was wrong. The court
adopted the Government's argument that there should be consistent treat-
ment, and held that the election to deduct intangible cost of drilling and
development as expense bound the taxpayer to the same treatment in
determining net income from the property for the purpose of applying
the 50% net income percentage depletion limitation." Here was the
square conflict sought by the Treasury; the Supreme Court was prac-
tically bound to intervene. It did so by granting certiorari in both the
Wilshire98 and F. H. E. Oil9 cases.
We are not at the moment concerned with the effect of the Reynolds
and Wilshire decisions from the standpoint of the immediate technical
questions involved, but rather from the standpoint of their bearing on
the broad question as to the effect of statutory reenactments upon out-
standing executive constructions. In the Wilshire case the Government
reiterated its insistence upon the "familiar" rule that successive or sub-
sequent reenactment carries with it legislative approval of previous regu-
lations." ° The Government then went on to distinguish the Reynolds
case by limiting it to cases in which the Commissioner attempted to give
a retroactive effect to amended regulations. The Wilshire case was argued
to involve no such attempt, but merely an attempt to apply an amended
93. See Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18, 23, n. 10 (U. S. 1939). rehcar-
ing denied, Dec. 11, 1939.
94. See G. C. Memo. 2315, VI-2, Cu,. Bt.TLT 21 (1927). The Government did not
claim so much as judge Foster held, but merely that G. C. Memo. 2315 foreshadowed an
official change of position; Government Brief in Vilshire case, p. 22.
95. U. S. Treas. Reg. 77, Art. 221 (h).
96. It was applied for three years if the new rule can be counted as beginning .with
G. C. Memo. 2315; but if the announcement of the new rule required a formal Treasury
decision or regulation, the new rule had never been applied under the 1926 Act.
97. The court referred to the Ambassador and Wilshire cases and stated that it did
not "find these decisions persuasive."
98. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 306 U. S. 628 (1939).
99. F. H. E. Oil Co. v. Helvering, 307 U. S. 618 (1939).
100. See Government Brief in Wilshire case, p. 15, citing Helvering v. -Winmill, 305
U- S. 79, 83 (1938) ; Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 312 (1938) ; United States v. Da-
kota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459, 466 (1933); Brewster v. Gage, 28 U. S. 327,
337 (1930).
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regulation prospectively. The Government thus surrendered the right
of the Commissioner to apply new regulations retroactively to a period
covered by old regulations which had been given legislative approval by
statutory reenactment.' 01 The taxpayer, on the other hand, though there
was confusion in the Wilshire situation as to whether any regulation was
outstanding under the 1926 Act, was insisting upon the application of
the Reynolds principle that reenactment incorporated a uniform inter-
pretation of an ambiguous provision susceptible of various meanings.
The Supreme Court held against the taxpayer. 0 2 It might have been
enough for the Court simply to distinguish the Reynolds case, as it did,
on the ground that it dealt with regulations applied retroactively, and
that the Wilshire case involved a less uniform history of administrative
construction. But fortunately for the enlightenment of taxpayers, the
Court went further. The opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas is divisible
into four parts, as follows:
(1) It was held that there was no basis for a claim of retroactivity.
The new regulations, Regulations 74, Article 221(i), "applied prospec-
tively only and did not purport to reach back to earlier years when the
taxpayer relied upon a different rule or practice."' 1 3 One making an
election in his 1925 return "took the risk" that the method of treatment
of depletion might be changed by Congress or, where the power existed,
by the Commissioner.
(2) A further answer to respondent's contention of inequity was
that a new election with respect to the deduction of intangible develop-
ment expense was given on June 18, 1927, extending for a six-months'
period, during which period General Counsel Memorandum 2315 clearly
stated to taxpayers the burdens which would flow from the benefits of
deducting such costs as expense.
(3) Mr. Justice Douglas then stated the Court's opinion that the new
regulations were valid irrespective of the above considerations because
the administrative construction under the 1921 Act which had received
legislative approval in the 1924 Act did not survive the enactment of the
1926 and 1928 Acts. There was no such administrative construction
under the 1926 Act to which Congress could have given approval in the
1928 Act; the more reasonable inference was that the phrase "net income
from the property" had been restored to its original ambiguity,
101. The Government was up against a difficult choice. It had to distinguish the Rey-
nolds case or urge that that case was wrongly decided. It chose to distinguish the case,
which perhaps was all that was necessary in arguing the Wilshire case. Its next task
may be to bring a case to the Supreme Court which will be indistinguishable so that the
Supreme Court may have a square opportunity to reconsider the Reynolds doctrine.
102. Accord: F. H. E. Oil Co. v. Helvering, 60 Sup. Ct. 26 (U. S. 1939). See (1939)
53 HAkv. L. REv. 323.
103. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18, 23 (U. S. 1939).
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which meant that it was again susceptible to a new administrative con-
struction.
(4) The final line of argument sustained the validity of the contested
regulations on broad grounds of administrative policy. For the Court
wisely saw peril for the rule-making powers of the Commissioner. "Tax
statutes and tax regulations never have been static. Experience, changing
needs, changing philosophies inevitably produce constant change in each."
"Experience and new insight can be expected to produce rather constant
change," particularly in connection with a technical subject. Restrictions
on the rule-making power "should not be lightly imposed where the
incidence of such rules as are promulgated is prospective only.V
104
More than that. The entire statutory reenactment rule needed restating,
at least in connection with prospective changes in regulations. The Court
seized the occasion:
". .. The oft-repeated statement that administrative construction
receives legislative approval by reenactment of a statutory provision,
without material change . . . ,covers the situation where the validity
of administrative action standing by itself may be dubious or where
ambiguities in a statute or rules are resolved by reference to admin-
istrative practice prior to reenactment of a statute; and where it does
not appear that the rule or practice has been changed by the ad-
ministrative agency through exercise of its continuing rule-making
power. It does not mean that a regulation interpreting a provision
of one act becomes frozen into another act merely by reenactment
of that provision, so that the administrative interpretation cannot be
changed prospectively through exercise of appropriate rule-making
powers. . . . The contrary conclusion would not only drastically
curtail the scope and materially impair the flexibility of adminis-
trative action; it would produce a most awkward situation. Out-
standing regulations which had survived one Act could be changed
only after a pre-view by the Congress. In preparation for a new
revenue Act the Commissioner would have to prepare in advance
new regulations covering old provisions. Their effectiveness would
have to await Congressional approval of the new Act. The effect
of such procedure, so far as time is concerned, would be precisety
the same as if these new regulations were submitted to the Congress
for approval. Such dilution of administrative powers would deprive
the administrative process of some of its most valuable qualities -
ease of adjustment to change, flexibility in light of experience, swift-
ness in meeting new or emergency situations. It would make the
administrative process under these circumstances cumbersome and
slow: Known inequities in existing regulations would have to await
the advent of a new revenue act. Paralysis in effort to keep abreast
of changes in business practices and new conditions would redound
104. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 18, 23, 25 (U. S. 1939), rehearihg
denied, Dec. 11, 1939.
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at times to the detriment of the revenue; at times to the disadvantage
of the taxpayer. Likewise the result would be to read into the grant
of express administrative power' an implied condition that they were
not to be exercised unless, in effect, the Congress had consented.
We do not believe that such impairment of the administrative
process is consistent with the statutory scheme which the Congress
has designed." 10 5
The Court could go no further in a case involving only a prospective
change in the regulations. The warning to be served upon both Govern-
ment and taxpayers is that the reenactment rule is not so broad as is
sometimes supposed by those who would use it to their advantage where
a retroactive change is made in the regulations. For the rule has its
limitations, and will not lightly be stretched to cover cases in which there
has been too little uniformity, or in which there is judicial disagreement,
or in which the regulations are themselves ambiguous, or where the
statute is plainly to the contrary. Even as to the past the rule has its
principal application to ambiguous or general statutes where the old
regulation takes a position in debatable territory. And as to the future,
an amendment of the regulations may be a valid exercise of the Com-
missioner's power despite continued reenactment approving a prior prac-
tice. Moreover, the validity of such a prospective change may not have
to await the sanction of a new reenactment of the statute.
The opinion in the Wilshire case affords the most satisfactory and
incisive discussion of the reenactment rule that has yet been handed down
by any court. Cogent and convincing arguments are advanced for some
degree of flexibility in administrative interpretation. Although in view
of our annual Congressional sessions the need for elasticity to meet
changing business conditions may not be so crying a demand as the
opinion makes it appear, nevertheless the Court's result was the ines-
capable practical solution. While the possibility of two different con-
structions placed upon the same statutory language may seem almost
humorous in its lack of logical consistency, yet the law must often break
through logical straitjackets. It is too much to expect that every regu-
lation should originally be announced in perfect form; a Commissioner
from whom such perfection was demanded would do nothing in preference
to doing wrong at a severe penalty. And a statute is a living thing; it
is not an unyielding mummy cloth in which the thoughts of Congress
are rigidly wrapped and sealed forever.
Still the case suggests its dangers, which lead one to hope that the
Treasury will apply its doctrine in accordance with rules of *fairness.
The Wilshire situation involved regulations offering the taxpayer certain
benefits in the form of deductions if he were prepared to accept cor-
relative burdens. Would the case permit the Commissioner to impose
105. Id. at 24.
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greater burdens upon the electing taxpayers by subsequent regulatory
amendments, albeit they might operate only prospectively? That question
was neatly sidestepped by the Court on the somewhat tenuous ground
that an informal opinion issued approximately two months prior to the
final date set for the taxpayer's election warned of the burdens to be
assumed. One is forced to wonder what the result would have been
had this General Counsel's Memorandum not been issued. Moreover,
the fact that a hiatus in the regulations had apparently occurred under
the 1926 Act, thereby restoring the statutory language as used in the
1928 Act to its "original ambiguity," prevents the opinion on its precise
facts from being authority for any universal assumption that all regu-
lations may be prospectively amended despite prior statutory reenactment.
Nevertheless the language of the Court is sufficiently broad to cover a
situation wherein the original administrative practice had been continuous
and uniform. It is also so sweeping in its tenor as to render of little
significance any distinction between purely interpretative regulations is-
sued under the general aegis of Section 62 and regulations specifically
authorized by particular provisions of the statute.""'
CONCLUSION
Few problems are of more permanent importance in tax law than the
administrative background of interpretative problems. Much ink, though
perhaps less thought, has been devoted to the complexities of our tax
laws. Without attempting to defend or attack this intricate structure,101
it must be pointed out that a complex business civilization breeds prob-
lems which cannot be met by a revenue act phrased in grammar-school
English. And furthermore it is essential to a proper administration of
the statutes that a flexible discretion be vested in the administrative
authorities. Any doctrine analogous to estoppel or stare decisis as ap-
plied to administrative interpretations would defeat their very purpose.
Especially is this true today in view of the innumerable Supreme Court
decisions which represent the ultimate interpretation of our taxing
statutes and which frequently necessitate a reversal or modification of
existing administrative policies. On the other hand, the goodwill of
taxpayers obviously cannot be maintained if the interpreting officials
change their position with the agility of trapeze performers. Even though
retroactive changes in the regulations or in more informal bureau opinions
106. See (1939) 53 lAnv. L. RE%. 323, 324. In fact, contrary to the assumption of the
Supreme Court, the regulation in the Wilshire case itself was hardly covered by the spe-
cific rule-making power as to depletion in § 23(1), which may well not have been intended
to e.-xtend to the specific percentage depletion provision in § 114(b) (3) ; Alvord, Trcairy,
Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case (Privately published manuscript, 1939) 5.
107. See Eichholz, Should the Federal Income Tax Be Simplified? (1939) 48 Y=,.u
L. J. 1200.
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may be legally justifiable, such practices lead to a feeling that no reliance
can be placed upon bureau officials; and the average taxpayer, having no
facilities to attack executive constructions, is not stimulated to any
attitude of fairness in filing his returns or in his use of tax-reducing
schemes.
The particular degree of weight to be given administrative rulings is
hardly a question which can be reduced to mathematical rules by any
statutory amendment; in the long run such a matter can best be left
to the wisdom of the courts. Any specific legislation as to the contents
or application of the regulations must take into account the promptness
with which some fairly authoritative construction of the statute must
be forthcoming. One possible remedy to prevent possible abuse of the
regulatory power might be to require public hearings in the future upon
all proposed interpretative or legislative regulations to be issued under
new sections of the statute. Such hearings would at least afford a public
airing to opposing views and serve to bring any serious inequities in
the proposals to the attention of Congress. At the same time amendments
to outstanding regulations could be discussed. It would clearly be self-
defeating, however, to have each new or amended regulation submitted
to Congress, or to add a blanket statutory incorporation by reference
of the outstanding regulations, since requiring such a legislative ex-
amination would run counter to the very objective of administrative
delegation, by consuming the time and attention of the legislators." 8
The retroactive evils of changed regulations, in so far as there may
still be room for retroactive application, might be lessened if the Supreme
Court were required to grant review to any circuit court of appeals or
Court of Claims decision reaching a result in conflict with a Treasury
regulation. It would then not be necessary to have such review await
the generation of a conflict in the lower courts, which is now often a
question of years. If the Supreme Court thereupon reverses the theory
of the regulations, the retroactive period of the new regulations occa-
sioned by the reversal will in many cases be considerably shortened. A
still further possibility to ease the axe of retroactivity would be a pro-
vision that some agency such as the Board of Tax Appeals should,
108. The method of requiring regulations to be laid before the legislature prior to
promulgation or prior to becoming finally effective has been a common technique in
England where it has been found to have the disadvantage of "shifting back into Parlia-
ment a discussion of things which Parliament had, with its eyes open, divested itself of."
2 REPORT OF ComITrma ON MiNisaERs' PowERs (1932) Minutes of Evidence, § 3666,
p. 272, cited in BLACHLY AND OATArAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGiSLATION AND ADJuDIcATIoN
(1934) 83. In questions of great importance, however, this method has the merit of bringing
the legislature into closer contact with the administrative branch and of overcoming,
through a legislative imprimatur, the hesitancy of the administrative authorities to accept
responsibility by taking affirmative action. See LANDIS, ThE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
(1938) 77-78.
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within a stated period, pass upon the reasonableness and validity of any
retrospective amendment to the regulations. The Board's unquestioned
technical equipment and competence in tax matters would assert itself
favorably in such a function." 9
109. The approval of administrative regulations by some agency or authority other than
that which first drafts them is a common type of control. Such a method has the advantage
.that an authority or body not charged with the task of administration is naturally less
partial and less departmentalized in its viewpoint. See BLrAcnLY A.D O.,TmA:m, op. cit.
sipra note 108, at 84.
